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"CONVENTION THEORY": 







This paper highlights overlap and differences between Convention Theory and New 
Organizational Institutionalism and thus states the strong case for profitable dialog. It shows 
how the former can facilitate new institutional approaches. First, convention theory rounds off 
the model of institutionalized action by turning the spotlight to the role of evaluation in the 
coordination effort. In parallel, the attention focused on the two components of the 
qualification process also sheds new light on the institutional dynamics issue at the heart of 
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"CONVENTION THEORY": 





Why attempt to ally convention theory (CT) and new institutional organization theory 
(NIOT)? Convention theory was birthed in France, parented by late-70s economics and 
sociology theory before being adopted into management theory in the 1990s, at the same time 
that neoinstitutional organization theory, buoyed by a vibrant research program and wave of 
publications, asserted itself as one of the dominant streams in organizational theory (Davis & 
Marquis 2005; Greenwood, Oliver et al. 2008). Conventionalists in France; 
neoinstitutionalists everywhere else. Why look further? Nevertheless, knowledge theory does 
offer up an argument that prompts between-discipline dialog. The point is that geographical 
specificity alone could never hope to explain away the mushrooming of different schools of 
thought. More and more commentators are speaking out against the „Balkanization‟ of this 
managerial research in search of a paradigm (Pfeffer 2007; AACSB 2007). We will not be 
expanding on this argument, as it takes us away from the focus of the paper. We put forward a 
second argument, one that we feel is critically more fundamental. Building bridges between 
these two streams of theory is a doubly compelling move since they already share many 
postulates and embrace the same core theoretical project: to offer a socially-embedded vision 
of organizational phenomena. Both streams are aligned to the same tributary of 'normative' 
perspectives as understood by Hans Joas. From the Weberian standpoint, they look to extend 
beyond a purely utilitarianist vision of society to encompass another universe that breeds 
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directions that are not simply slaved to individual calculation but that actively shape them 
(Weber 1967[1905]; Joas 1996). There is also an altogether more pragmatic rationale pushing 
us to pursue the work started by others (Gomez & Jones 2000; Leca & Naccache 2008). 
Efforts led in the late 80s to concenter American and Scandinavian institutional perspectives 
(Brunsson & Adler 1989; Brunsson & Olsen 1993; Czarniawska-Joerges & Sevón 1996; 
Boxenbaum & Strandgaard Pedersen 2009) showed such potential that the invitation was 
clearly there to follow the same path.  
  The first problem that needs unraveling is to settle on a scope of comparison. NIOT, and 
to a lesser extent CT, are hazily-boundaried, broad-content streams of theory. We therefore 
set ourselves clear-cut scope selection rules. Looking at NIOT, the long time span covered 
and exceptional profusiveness of the research published is compensated for by major 
collectively-authored works identified within the discipline itself as seminal pillars. One is 
The new institutionalism in organizational analysis by Powell & DiMaggio (1991), the other 
is the Handbook of organizational institutionalism by Greenwood et al. (2008). Since both 
books are positioned as meta-guides, we will tap into the references they contain for our 
analytical material. For CT, which is broadly cross-disciplinary, we determined three 
condition-sets for gating-in the research to be included: first and foremost, they have to refer 
explicitly to 'conventions'; they then need to have the organization as principal analytical 
focus; and lastly, they have to be core references shared jointly by all authors writing under 
the adopted banner of the CT stream.  
  Let us refocus on our central target question. What are the features of convention theory 
that set it apart from new institutional organization theory? This paper asserts that 
contributions from CT can facilitate modern NIOT approaches, and on more than one count. 
First, convention theory rounds off the model of institutionalized action by turning the 





































0  5 
qualification processes founded on higher-order principles of justice and grounded in material 
systems. The attention focused on these two components of the qualification process also 
sheds new light on the institution dynamics issue at the heart of NIOT research since the mid-
90s, since CT highlights two action structuration systems hitherto missing from 
neoinstitutional theory. Firstly, it underlines the role that the intrinsic quality of the 
convention can play. The effectiveness vectored through the worded statement of the 
institution and the material system supporting it can thus help shape whether it is maintained, 
spreads or withdraws. Second, CT leverages compromise as a concept to chart a potential 
pathway towards resolving competition between several different institutions operating within 
the same radius of action, an issue NIOT has so far neglected. This compromise, by defining a 
social good that meshes several orders of worth, creates the framework necessary to define 
stable coordination principles despite the divergent initial positions rationalized, and to 
eliminate some of the uncertainty intrinsic to coordination action. 
  This article sets out by stating the strong case for profitable dialog between these two 
streams, highlighting their overlap (I). We build an analysis of the theories that sparked each 
stream (I.1.), their relationship with mainstream economics theory (I.2.), and the postulates 
and research questions they share (I.3.). The next step, aimed at exploring their differences, 
engages a systematized investigation of their analytical mechanics (II). Institution, 
convention, justification, theorization, order of worth, logic, city, world, discipline, 
compromise, logic competition... all these concepts are clearly framed and compared pairwise 
to surface differences in their ability to capture research objects. It is within these differences 
that resides the key unlocking how CT can facilitate NIOT approaches (III).  
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I - A MUTUAL THEORETICAL PROJECT  
 
Shared references  
  Several recent studies have treemapped the parentage of NIOT (Scott 1987; Selznick 
1996; Hirsch & Lounsbury 1997; Greenwood et al. 2008; Scott 2008[1995]). Though it is 
important not to get sidetracked on rewriting the discipline‟s history, we nevertheless need to 
underscore a handful of salient traits highlighted in this prior groundwork. Commentators 
generally tend to split the stream into two phases: old institutionalism and new 
institutionalism. The boundary lines between the two schools remain fuzzy. That first period 
appears to have evolved in the XIXth century to reach the peak of its influence following 
WWII, championed by Selznick (Selznick 1949; Selznick 1957; Selznick 1969), Parsons 
(Parsons & Shils 1951; Parsons & Smelser 1956; Parsons 1960) and Stinchcombe 
(Stinchcombe 1965; Stinchcombe 1997). The rebirth of the second phase is often ascribed to 
the work of John Meyer, principally the seminal paper on formal structures as myth and 
ceremony, co-authored with Rowan (Meyer & Rowan 1977), and consolidated by DiMaggio 
& Powell (1983). We therefore need to look at the first school to trace the roots of NOIT. A 
first-glance look sees XIXth-century institutional economists Mitchell, Veblen and most 
importantly Commons widely touted as founders of the movement (Van De Ven 1993; Scott 
2008[1995]). Their rejection of the postulates governing economic man, their efforts to bypass 
the marginalist thinking that ultimately spawned unsubstantive balances, and their broad-
ranging descriptive empirical studies anchor them as benchmark figures of NIOT (Gomez 
2004). The sociological roots of NIOT remain far more elusive, complexified by multiple 





































0  7 
that Weber's work provides the keystone for the school as a stream
1 (DiMaggio & Powell 
1983). We also notice the influence of Bourdieu‟s sociology even if this one is much more 
implicit (DiMaggio 1979). The picture is completed by registering the influence of Berger & 
Luckmann's The Social Construction of Reality (1966) on the sociology of knowledge, 
borrowed on heavily by cognitive and microscale NIOT approaches (Meyer & Rowan 1977; 
Zucker 1991).  
  Convention theory, on the other hand, is solidly grounded in economics, emerging in 
France from the heterodox economics school of thought (the March 89 special issue of Revue 
Economique features a collection of the seminal papers). CT shares the same heritage 
pedigree of pioneer American institutionalists as NIOT (Veblen, Commons), but also 
integrates input from behaviorist economics thought (Simon 1947 [1997]; Leibenstein 1976; 
Leibenstein 1978)
2. It is this influence that proves pivotal in explaining where CT and NIOT 
diverge. Several French commentators have previously traced how the scientific project of 
NIOT developed counter to the behaviorist theories that were so predominant in the USA 
(Friedberg 1998; Courpasson 2000). The fact is that NIOT strived to underline the role of 
social structure as a determinant of human behavior in order to counterbalance the boundless 
autonomy assigned to the agent under behaviorist theory. French-school sociology on the 
other hand had no imperative to carve out an identity in the shadow of behaviorist-led 
dominance, leaving CT to draw on behaviorist input. This influence translates the CT-specific 
project to develop a substantive perspective on the exercise of rationality in real-world 
settings based on modeling coordination behavior. Hence the platform given to influences 
from other social science disciplines focused on social interaction, such as the philosophy 
                                                                 
1 An important factor to underline is that there was no English-language translation of the German sociologist's 
work until the 1946 (Economy and society) version, which was translated by Talcott Parsons himself. 
2 Although hard-line behaviorists such as Pavlov or Skinner deny any agency capability for individuals who 
offer a mechanical 'black box' response to stimuli, 'behaviorist'-tagged theories in economics/managerial science 
cut more slack. Simon or Leibenstein may well be filed under 'behaviorists', but it remains undeniable that their 
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approaches championed by people like David K. Lewis (1969) or René Girard (1978). As the 
French stream of convention theory is more recent, its development was not dissociated from 
the early work of the NTIO stream. Whereas the influence of Selznick and Stinchcombe has 
incontestably helped shape the application of CT to organizational patterns and phenomena 
(Gomez 1996), neoinstitutionalism has itself been left in the dark.  
 
The same movement to dialog/challenge orthodox economic theory  
Throughout its development, NIOT has maintained some degree of direct dialog with 
economic organization theory and institutional economics (Roberts & Greenwood 1997; 
Roberts 2008). Williamson has regularly published position statements on progress in NIOT 
(Williamson 1985). We assert that this dialog has been made possible by sharing certain 
analytical stances. Indeed, NIOT has always remained faithful to methodological 
individualism, and does recognize a degree of agency to act in the world (DiMaggio 1988; 
Dacin et al. 2002). In economics jargon, NIOT fleshes out this vision of human behavior with 
the endogenization of a set of community rules
3. Based on in-depth analysis of the ties 
between NIOT and mainstream economic theory, Roberts claims that any influence NIOT 
may have had on economic organizational theory was essentially indirect, it being relayed by 
other sociologically-framed research streams like population ecology (legitimacy metrics by 
Carroll & Freeman), social networks (integration of norms as conceptualized by Portes, 1998) 
and economic sociology (cross-correlations demonstrated by Fligstein, 2001) that do dialog 
directly with orthodox economics (Roberts & Greenwood 1997; Roberts 2008). To round off, 
teams have recently coupled both perspectives in their explanatory models in an attempt to 
                                                                 
3 An interesting point to add here is that recent developments in orthodox economics have looked to account for 
the community dimension of human action. 'Informational cascade' theory is just one example. Having a 
multitude of agents adopting the same behavior pattern creates a rational barrier (rational herd) for the target 
individual, prompting them to rationally prefer an assessment based on public-sphere data rather than their own 
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analyze their mutual influence (Roberts & Greenwood 1997; Deephouse 1999; Ahmadjian & 
Robinson 2001; Rao et al. 2001).  
  Convention theory, though, is “genetically hardwired” to dialog with mainstream 
theory, since it is so strongly grounded in institutional economics (Salais 2006). This dialog is 
inherently conflictual, since CT has always run counter to the dominant marginalist models 
(Veblen 1909). However, convention theory does also have its own axiomatic fingerprint that 
differentiates it from institutionalist economics. Pushed to give a common denominator shared 
by the disparate array of research streams umbrellaed under the catch-all label „institutional 
economics‟, the answer would have to be that they all share the same ultimate study focus: 
institutions, i.e. the rules of economics (rules and norm-sets that influence behavior). In many 
cases, institution rhymes with “explicit rules”. Convention theory, on the other hand, is 
primarily focused on research into implicit behavioral rules (Gomez 2003). This makes a far 
sharper challenge to the postulates of the classical economic model, since individual 
reasoning can be fuelled by exogenous factors outside their comprehension. What makes CT 
so compelling is that it offers a straightforward interpretative framework for understanding 
how economic rationality works and how it readjusts. It therefore also offers key insight into 
the social construction of performance and the efficiency indicators that shape a specific type 
of institution.  
 
An allied analytical stance  
Both CT and NIOT propose a socially-engineered vision of human behavioral patterns, but 
both reject a purely structuralist approach. Both schools advance the same “agent-institution” 
dialectic: there is a mutual feedback loop between individual decisioning that shapes rules and 
rules that shape individual decisioning. The goal is to co-model both the individual and the 
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an infinite set of possibilities but rather a bounded and constrained choice from among a 
narrow panel of socially legitimate options. This dialectic between individual and structural 
entity, which is widely termed structuration, tolled the end of the irreducible duality between 
culture and action that had so dominated social change theory until the 1970s 
4.  
  Ct and NIOT also share the same antifunctionalist vision, in a broad departure from the 
rational agent pictured as developing the practices best-geared to solving a problem. Writings 
throughout the history of organizational institutionalism have consistently echoed this deep-
rooted antifunctionalism. Selznick asserts that “practices can become infused with values 
beyond the technical requirements at hand” (1957: 17). Meyer & Rowan demonstrated how 
organizational structures are geared more towards responding to social logic than economic 
rationales: “elements of formal structure are manifestations of powerful institutional rules 
which function as highly rationalized myths that are binding on particular organizations” 
(1977: 343). Powell & DiMaggio explicitly championed institutional isomorphism as the 
alternative to functionalist and Marxist-led explanations: “The ubiquity of certain kinds of 
structural arrangements can more likely be credited to the universality of mimetic processes 
than to any concrete evidence that the adopted models enhance efficiency” (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991[1983]: 70). The conventionalist school sees the real world as the product of 
radical economic uncertainty, aligning to F.H. Knight, and sees agents as ontologically 
limited in their capacity to self-reason. This means that agents, in their interactions, tap into 
coordination networks that do not require self-reasoned calculation but which are built on past 
rationalizations, i.e. conventions. These conventions, despite starting out from a sound basis, 
may nevertheless be out-of-phase with the coordination situation in which they are marshaled. 
                                                                 
4 Structuration continues to be regularly associated with the theory of practice, itself a generic term 
encompassing a school of heterodox thinkers, Bauman, Z. (1973). Culture as Praxis. London, Routledge; and 
Kegan Paul, Sahlins, M. (1976). Culture and Practical Reason. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 
Giddens, A. (1984). The Constitution of Society. Berkeley, University of California Press, Sewell, W. H. (1992). 
"A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation." American Journal of Sociology 98(1): 1, Barley, 
S. R. and P. S. Tolbert (1997). "Institutionalization and structuration: Studying the links between action and 
institution." Organization Studies 18(1): 93-117. The thread binding these works together is that they all 
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Only the agent can see the evidence that they need to be employed without any reflective 
analysis on the current situation. The net result is that conventions are not marshaled based on 
strictly functionalist rationale. This is why the conventionalist crisis sparked when the 
convention employed is too far out of phase with the situation being faced actually provides a 
golden opportunity to pinpoint those conventions that structure action (Gomez 1997; Gomez 
2003).  
  Although NIOT makes no explicit reference to crisis-points as a first-choice research 
focus, it does have a two-decade history of studying institutional dynamics and, consequently, 
all the situations where the dominant institutions do not or no longer automatically fit. From 
the violent upheaval caused by exogenous shock to prevailing structures through to frictional 
conflict between competing logic systems and back to individual reasoning de-embedded 
from collective rationalizations, crisis-points can all be chartered in as golden opportunities to 
witness institutionalization at work. This attachment to problem-cases stems from a CT and 
NIOT-shared vision of pragmatism as a strong empirical footing key to realistically 
accounting for inter-individual situation-driven coordination (Salais, 2006). Both streams 
claim roots in methodological individualism while concomitantly searching social structures 
for the source of action. Their research program polarizes around these two core issues: how 
is individual choice shaped by the institutional environment, and how do institutions evolve? 
The spotlight turns to message delivery as a proxy for contemporary rationalization processes.  
  Convention theory and new institutional organization theory clearly have a lot in 
common. These close ties prompt comparative analysis in an effort to cross-fertilize ideas 
generated from the two fields of research. However, conceptual clarifications are required 
before we can set out on this path, as although they share the same project, the two streams 
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be to run a systematized cross-comparison of their analytical mechanics in order to explore 
how they describe the phenomena under focus.  
 
II. ARE CONVENTIONS JUST LIKE ANY OTHER INSTITUTION?  
 
  We will need to tread carefully as we move to decipher the analytical mechanics of 
these two schools. Concepts re-employed across the same school of thought often envelop 
broadly diverse realities, to the point that their success often hinges on this very elasticity. A 
few precautionary measures on methodology are therefore warranted. We opted to shortlist a 
limited number of concept couples that i) describe phenomena overlapping into each of the 
two approaches and ii) occupy a core node in their respective intellectual architectures. Each 
concept will be addressed through the work of authors who are heavyweight in the field and 
whose definitions are widely referenced by others.  
  For NIOT, we will be targeting the shaping/effects of a dominant logic or competing 
logic systems within an organizational field. These logic systems are forged by long 
societally-led rationalization processes, but they also re-theorized by field members, acting 
as a scaffold forming institutions that will go on to at least partially dictate member 
behaviors.  
  For CT, the conceptualization effort will be targeted at a specific institution format, i.e. 
the convention. As for NIOT, our task will be to analyze how these conventions are forged, 
their effects and/or the challenges leveled at them. Conventions are founded on shared forms 
of evaluation that qualify the coordination purposes or strategies. The evaluation itself hinges 
on material systems and takes its basis in the higher-order principles of justification. That 
said, CT also seeks to accurately describe a generic operational model for these orders of 
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expression in different worlds; reality corresponds to the common world in which these 
different orders clash. 
 
Institution vs institution  
  The first comparison may take us off-guard, as both bodies of literature harness 
“institution” as a term. Robert Boyer claims that for CT, “the notion of institution should be 
understood in its broader meaning to encompass all forms of social mediation: customs, 
conventions, rules, norms, organizations and institutions in the strictest sense of the term” 
(Boyer 2003). This definition mirrors that used by institutional economists (North 1990) and 
proponents of NIOT theory. The interpretative framework given by R. W. Scott does feature 
the different types of institution: coercive, normative and cognitive (Scott 2008 [1995]). Both 
research streams therefore cluster post-conscious dimensions and pre-conscious dimensions 
(Roberts, 2008).  
  If we change lens for a wider angle and focus in on the types of constructs that 
designate institutions in sociology, we can roughly contour four inclusive layers of use (layer 
2 including layer 1, and so on):  
  Institutions = particular types of organization.  
  Institutions = broad sectors of social life (family, economy, science, religion)  
  Institution = any „social construct‟ that gives rules governing different shades of 
conscious/unconscious action   (cognitive, normative, coercive).  
  Institutions = core, tacitly-understood social rulesets enabling individuals to 
coordinate their action. This last group, unsurprisingly, is one of the first-choice 
research focuses for microsociological symbolic interactionism for instance
5. 
Ethnomethodology, one of the shapers of NIOT, has also defined a fundamental set of 
                                                                 
5 Also corresponding, for example, to what Goffman and the interactionist school termed “social meaning of 
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institutions, called interpretative procedures: reciprocity of perspective (the postulate 
that other people see the same world as I do); indexicality (the postulate that making 
sense of what is done or said is dependent on the immediate context in which the 
action is embedded); a prospective sense of occurrence (the postulate that others will 
do or say something that will clarify what they have said or done to date).  
  Analysis of the types of object captured by institutions in the empirical research of each 
stream surfaces a first key difference. In NIOT, institutions tend to emerge in the third layer, 
i.e. the level characterized by rules governing collective action. To illustrate, new 
institutionalists will study the take-on of a reform in education (Meyer 1992), the 
implementation of recycling practice (Lounsbury 2001), the transformation of succession 
recruitment patterns in the publishing industry (Thornton & Ocasio 1999). CT on the other 
hand will focus instead on layer-three and layer-four objects. Conventionalists are digging for 
clues on quality evaluation in marketplaces for production factors or consumer goods and 
clues on all the qualification efforts that prelude local arrangements. This leaves us with a 
“vertical pluralism” of conventions, squaring off conventions that require public legitimacy 
such as currency trust or salary classifications and the more local-scale conventions such as 
those that wick away uncertainty in micro-interactions at work or in family circles (Eymard-
Duvernay, Callon et al. 2002; Eymard-Duvernay 2006).  
 
Convention vs institution  
If the investigative object-focuses of conventionalists do not completely cross-match those of 
the neoinstitutionalists, it is partly because conventions account for a specific subcategory of 
institutions. PY Gomez stresses that is critically important to work from a clear definition of 
the convention, as it not only designates an empirical reality but also acts as a conceptual 
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stream hinges on the seminal work of D. Lewis, who took the stance that there are three 
components to a convention: 1) a convention emerges in a situation of uncertainty where an 
agent‟s utility is indeterminate outside of their utility as pre-expected by other agents; 2) a 
convention offers regularity, making it possible to resolve repeat problems that could not 
otherwise be resolved by hermetic individual calculation alone; 3) a convention is based on 
shared belief under the 5 Lewis-criteria condition-set: everyone complies with the convention, 
all adopters expect everyone else to also comply, everyone prefers general compliance to less-
than-general compliance; there is an alternative regularity solution (an important point, since 
NIT models have skipped over the competition factor); these first 4 conditions outlined are 
common knowledge (Lewis 1969).  
  A convention therefore translates as a shared interpretation whose purpose is to solve an 
uncertainty problem. In any transaction, conventions “channel uncertainty based on a 
common form of evaluation that qualifies elements or strategies for coordination” (Eymard-
Duvernay, 2006: 6). They are therefore seen as an alternative coordination set-up to 
contractualization. Conventionalists make use of this same convention term to designate 
agreements between individuals both inside and outside the bounds of the firm. With the firm 
as setting, one convention to highlight is the effort convention, which makes it possible to 
resolve the uncertainty issue weighing over the level of effort to be put in
6.  
  Conventions, then, are institutions in a class of their own. They embrace both the 
cognitive dimensions (pre-consciously shaping behavior) and the normative dimensions (only 
effective if it is self-evident that the others will also honor it) of the institutions described by 
Scott (1995). Most importantly, though, conventions are founded on value-giving principles 
that make it possible to rank objects and individual strategies. These value-giving principles, 
                                                                 
6 This definition gives conventions a solid footing in procedural rationality: a convention can be defined as a 
problem-solving procedure that is known before the problem arises. Conventions thus bring justification to 
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themselves founded on justifications, are the means used to qualify the action frame and the 
object of the interaction.  
 
Justification vs theorization  
  Justification occupies a pivotal position in CT. Here, justification is defined as a 
positive sanction, as opposed to criticism which is seen as a devaluation. As touched on 
above, justification brings value-giving principles that seat the convention in a clearly ordered 
frame between coordination elements and coordination strategies. The justification always 
steps in when there is uncertainty or conflicting evaluation. It mobilizes a shared higher-order 
principle, i.e. values or ends that extend outside of the situation box. Within a given space, the 
shared higher-order principle is able to harness the notions of worth and social good. It 
imposes order in an otherwise complex situation, and enables this order to become the focus 
of a consensus agreement since there is equivalency between the worth and the social good. 
This higher-order principle is unique, and it excludes all other principles, which find 
themselves reduced to the production of self-interested personal goods rather than social 
good.  
  The positive sanction distils into a qualification process, i.e. conferring a quantitative 
attribute, a dimensional state of worth. The state attribution process can be conceptualized as 
a coding operation, since it operates to establish equivalency between a particular being and a 
generalized category (such as big/small). This means that it hinges on a pre-existing 
equivalency matrix cross-tabulating specific things against general worths. It is also grounded 
in a qualification system, or proofs of worth that test the logic underpinning the quantitative 
attribute (metrics instruments, anecdotal evidence [cherry-picking]).  
  Despite playing a core role in CT, the term justification as a term is completely missing 
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theorization is a core scaffold in the neoinstitutionalist architecture. Theorizing is understood 
as cognitively connecting the ends and means in a causal relation (Tolbert & Zucker 1996; 
Strang & Soule 1998). This theorization step is processually central to institutionalization as it 
forms an unconditional pre-requisite to the mass adoption of new practices (Greenwood, 
Hinings et al. 2002: 60). Theorization is simply the local translation of vast rationalization 
systems, the system drivers being economic competition, occupational groups, nation-States 
and the media (Meyer & Rowan 1977; Powell & DiMaggio 1983). A rationalization system is 
a shared sensegiving framework through which individuals are able to interpret and make 
sense of the world they live in (Powell & DiMaggio 1991; Hasselbladh & Kallinikos 2000). 
NIOT asserts that the theorization process can tap into two categories of “higher-order 
principles”: economic efficiency, or the dominant norm in the discipline.  
  This takes us to a point where justification does not appear to fit perfectly with 
theorization. It refers directly to the common higher-order principles upon which judgment is 
grounded, opting to gloss over the rhetoric vector expressing the qualification per se. CT 
offers a general-purpose model for intermeshing higher-order principle with institution, 
whereas NIOT bypasses this abstraction leap to head straight for its specific higher-order 
principles, i.e. economic efficiency and the field-governing normative order, without 
conceptualizing what ties these principles and the field-dominating institutions together. 
Furthermore, NIOT also encompasses a material dimension embedded in proofs of worth. The 
technical systems instrumentalizing coordination form an integral component of the 
theoretical conventionalist model (Boltanski & Thévenot 1991: 31). Continuing the parallel 
drawn with NIOT, justification also resonates the objectification step that NIOT sees as 
differentiated from any institutionalization process alongside theorization (Hasselbladh & 
Kallinikos 2000; Greenwood et al. 2002). Hasselbladh & Kallinikos assert that the 
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rules and metrics”. This objectification therefore mirrors the qualification processes upon 
which justification is anchored.  
 
Order of worth vs logics  
The CT research thrust goes further still. Formalizing the content of justifications makes it 
possible to categorize them into broad sets. For CT theorists, the aggregation of different 
forms of qualification, i.e. justification systems, is an indicator flagging the existence of 
orders of justification or orders of worth (Boltanski & Thévenot 1991; Stark 2005, 2009). 
CT-school researchers have analyzed the common-denominator structures underpinning all 
the orders and have attempted to develop a generic model able to integrate the whole range of 
orders. They banked on the fact that while there can be no common measure of plural values, 
it does remain possible to theorize the process by which agreements nevertheless get forged. 
The factor that is generalizable is the process that reference-frames an abstract model and the 
economy of the abstract model itself. Each order is therefore able to tap into higher-order 
principles established in political philosophy. These thought systems can thus be seen as 
attempts to set the rules binding common agreement, or in other words, a higher-order 
principle of justification. If an agent looks to decide on the fundamental justice of a given 
conflictual situation, they can refer to a higher-order principle upon which previous agreement 
was based. Going forward, each individual order is grounded in a form of qualification and is 
deeply seated within historical and cultural boundaries
7. Nevertheless, different orders of 
worth can co-exist within the same space. Going further, the same one person can refer to all 
existing order-of-worth constructs, which runs counter to current social science dogma which 
attaches value systems or cultures to social groups (Boltanski & Thévenot 1991: 30).  
                                                                 
7 It is interesting at this juncture to spotlight Laurent Thévenot‟s attempt to add a new “Ecology” city as logic-
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  For authors writing under the NIOT banner, the theorizations embedding institutions are 
also allied to vast rationalization movements that can be contoured specifically within a 
certain social perimeter or organizational field. This gets them termed „logics‟. Alford & 
Friedland first coined the use of the term “institutional logic” in new institutionalist literature 
(Alford &Friedland 1985; Friedland 1991)
8. The term has since staked out a foothold as the 
descriptor for an ends-means couple specific to an organizational field, i.e. “agreement shared 
within a boundaried space and governing the goals to pursue and the resources and methods to 
be mobilized to get there” (Scott, 87, 94). Thornton & Ocasio offer a more sociology-flavored 
definition, where logic is “the historic model constructed socially based on material practices, 
postulates, values, belief systems and rulesets that enable individuals to produce and 
reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and give meaning to their 
social reality” (1999: 804).  
  Proponents of NIOT hold that institutional logic is exclusive to an organizational field 
where it pre-consciously structures individual behaviors. As the fields occupy an infinite 
thought-space, there are an infinite number of logics possible. Order of worth, on the other 
hand, is tied to a city, i.e. an ideal-type rationality that has no pure form in reality but that is 
nevertheless finite and countable. The CT school has battled to define a minimal number of 
cities capable of capturing the majority of justifications employed in contemporary 
coordination action. Since the city is an ideal-type, abstracted category, there is latitude for 
several orders to co-occupy the same social space and − crucially − for agents to navigate 
between orders.  
 
 
                                                                 
8 Alford and Friedland employ logic at a macro-scale level of analysis, meaning it would not hold so true when 
the NIOT stream later marshaled the concept. Alford and Friedland‟s work depicts frictions between three 
institutional orders: capitalism, State bureaucracy, and political democracy. Their standpoint was that each order 
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Worlds vs fields:  
  Worlds are clusters of beings and systems that are empirical manifestations of the cities 
abstracted by CT, i.e. the pure ideal-type expressions of orders of worth. Worlds are therefore 
structured by a set of action principles founded on an order of worth. The common world 
corresponds to the real world, where several orders co-exist. Any one world, then, is built of a 
set of fixed elements: subjects, objects, shared higher-order principle, individual dignity, 
status of worth, investment tying the benefits of „superior‟ statuses to the sacrifice that has to 
be made to reap them, worth ratio, relations tying subjects to objects, figures, challenges, 
judgment, evidence, forfeiture… These worlds are not attached to social groups and they do 
not have permanent representatives, but they do apply and emerge in given situations.  
  Understood this way, the notion of world “paves the way to a new systematic approach 
to organizations which are handled not as unified entities that are characterized through 
reference to spheres of activity, actor systems or fields, but instead as composite assemblages 
that feature component systems imported from different worlds. “ […] “Indeed, it is precisely 
the aggregation of different systems tied into different worlds that translates the tensions 
worked on through these organizations” (Boltanski & Thévenot 1991: 32). “By employing 
[conventions], the actors surface a framework guiding knowledge and action, a world they 
can suppose is known to other actors (making it a common world). This world is a place 
where everyone interacts in a coordinated manner. The uncertainty inherent to the singularity 
of the novel situation can be overcome; the actors begin to find their bearings, and actions 
gain meaning; the fate of the coordination effort can be prevised and the common goal can be 
targeted and, more often than not, achieved“ (Salais 2006).  
  The new institutionalists, however, have stitched the notion of logic to a specific 
socially-boundaried space: the organizational field. Field, as an idea, is undeniably 
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continues to rage (AOM Session 2008). That said, there is no denying that it occupies a 
pivotal position in the conceptual architecture underpinning NIOT, and which developed in 
the late-70s as a countercurrent to behaviorist theory, rejecting the depth of the organizational 
layer and underlining the structural determinism of the field. If we move forward with Powell 
& DiMaggio (1983: 4), the field functions as the new unit of analysis enabling organization 
theory to move beyond a purely binary vision of the firm as either a closed or open system: 
“the virtue of this unit of analysis is that it directs our attention not simply on competing firms 
(…) but to the totality of relevant actors. In doing this, the field idea comprehends the 
importance of both connectedness (see Laumann and al., 1978) and structural equivalence 
(White and al., 1976)”. The virtues of the field may appear clear, but its boundaries much less 
so. Powell & DiMaggio (1983) claim the field “aggregates organizations that, taken together, 
represent a recognized area of institutional life” while Scott (1995: 56) asserts that “a field is a 
community of organizations sharing the same sensegiving system and whose members 
interact together more frequently and more purposively that with individuals outside the 
field”. Traditionally, then, the field was used to describe zones of stability and consensus, 
groups of clearly-identified organizations interconnected by a shared set of norms
9. The net 
result is that a field appears more structure-building than a world. It is tied to certain 
interplaying organizations, and to a determined physical space. This contrasts with the world, 
which finds expression in situational settings and which should be seen as a resource for the 
actors present.  
   
                                                                 
9 Hoffmann recently refreshed the field concept by giving it a less brickwalled, less structuring vision (Hoffman, 
2001), redefining a field as forged by organizations united in a shared social challenge. This gives the latitude for 
an organization to be embedded in several fields, which goes on to create tensions and rival claims within what 
were formerly described as fields of stability. Either way, the field remains a structural foundation. Even fields 
that look to be stable are riven with power struggles as powerful players fight to maintain the institutional order 
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III. IN WHAT WAYS CAN CONVENTIONAL THEORY FACILITATE NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY?  
 
  The previous sections in this paper have underlined the points of convergences 
alongside points of divergence differentiating the conventionalist school and organizational 
neoinstitutionalism. These differences in theoretical templates or analytical mechanics point 
to a potential for cross-fertilization between the two research streams. Our new point of 
departure is now to show how CT can facilitate new institutional-school approaches. This 
facilitation role is even clearer now that the NIOT research program has reached the end of a 
ten-year shift to zoom in on field dynamics and conflictual heterogeneity. As underscored by 
K. Weick, CT is a credible candidate for tying together macroscale cognitive structures and 
local sensemaking microprocessors (Weick, Sutcliffe et al. 2005: 417). CT should therefore 
be able to usher the actor into institutionalization processes without typecasting them into 
same old clichéd heroic action roles given by institutional entrepreneurship work.  
  From the conventionalist standpoint, evaluation is at the heart of how the actors are able 
to sensemake or indeed senselose. This qualification process foundations how actors are able 
to implement a behavior they see as normal. In the words of the fathers of CT, “the agent 
must seize the situation and the actions of others, which they do using conventional 
frameworks, before they can coordinate action. This situation-seizing process is not simply 
cognitive but also evaluative, with the form of evaluation dictating the importance of what the 
agent seizes and takes into account. It is at this juncture, in the coordination process, that we 
see the real place for collective values and social goods, fulfilling a role that extends far 
beyond the status of individual preferences to scaffold the coordination conventions that carry 
the greatest legitimacy“ (Eymard-Duvernay et al. 2006). Rephrased, coordination between 
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elements in a shared situation. Although the uncertainty remains consubstantial with 
coordination, this is not solely down to information asymmetry as orthodox economics theory 
would have it. It is actually due to the interpretative rationality of the actors drawing on 
collective forms of evaluation to sense-make situations. Given that evaluation holds such a 
key position in conventionalist action theory, it is evident that the judgment criteria and the 
material systems that ground this evaluation are equally central
10. Conventions will therefore 
be based on the higher-order principles underpinning the judgment and on concrete challenges 
that serve to confirm the judgment. The neoinstitutionalists, though, have generally glossed 
over these dimensions.  
  Hasselbladth & Kalinikoss (2000) sounded out that NIOT was overly centered on actors 
and ideas and that it presented an idealized vision of the rationalization process. These 
processes cannot be reduced to a “spillover of disembodied ideas” and institutions are more 
than simply “freefloating clusters of idea”. They explain how ideas are objectified, i.e. 
embedded in social artefacts such as texts, templates, software, etc., concluding in a call to 
investigate the very architecture of these rationalized objects and how it shapes their 
transmissibility. This sound-out has been echoed in the recently-coined “objectivation” that 
has crept into the neoinstitutionalist lexicon, although without prompting any solid empirical 
studies. Message delivery and the discursive approach remain the preferred focus of 
investigations in NIOT (Phillips & Malhotra 2008). This contrasts with conventionalist 
thinking, where the technical media vectoring the convention is considered as equally integral 
a part of the convention as the way it is stated 
11 (Gomez 1996).  
                                                                 
10 This paper only goes as far as to spell out the hypothesis that the focus conventionalists grant to qualification 
and valuation processes stems from CT‟s grounding in economics. The primary object of CT research is and 
always has been the transaction, notably as a specific coordination issue. CT research has, by extension, focused 
in on every format of coordination, with qualification not covering the object exchanged but the strategies that 
best fit the interaction „game‟. 
11 This is where French papers are visibly biased by the sociology of the translation which has always placed all 
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  This duality inherent to the convention opens up the question of the factors determining 
the quality of a convention. A sound conviction is a conviction able to eliminate much of the 
uncertainty weighing on coordination situations by being convincing enough to all the actors 
in the coordination environment. CT, though, devolves part of the convention‟s soft power of 
conviction to the intrinsic quality of the information it contains. This approach suggests there 
is an endogenous source-factor dictating whether or not institutions bring stability − a factor 
that NIOT has thus far chosen to ignore. NIOT has striven to describe the source-factor of 
institutionalization dynamics as stemming from either shocks that are exogenous to the field 
studied or from the actions of individual entrepreneurs fighting to either anchor or overturn 
the institution in place. The conventionalist viewpoint is that the convention trajectory can 
depend on its self-specific quality, i.e. the clarity of its statement (what the goal is, who 
should it serve, in what situations it needs to be employed,...) and its materializing systems 
(evaluation scale, judgment criteria, proof of mutual adoption…), but also on the cohesion 
bonding its two core components. This means that any change in the situation-qualifying 
instruments can either trigger a crisis within the prevailing convention, or else bolster it.  
  If NIOT skips over materializing systems, it also ignores the other key component in 
qualification processes: the higher-order principles that foundation the judgment. For 
neoinstitutionalists, institutions, as collective action rulesets, respond to logics that are 
specific to organizational fields. It follows that there are an infinite number of logics. NIOT 
researchers have not looked to typify these logics, nor even to build a general model of how 
they work. CT, on the other hand, has delved into the issue of value, and thus opened up 
pathways that NIOT is yet to explore. CT authors have attempted to highlight the existence of 
a modest number of orders of justification or orders of worth. They have analyzed the 
common-denominator structures underpinning all the orders and have attempted to scaffold a 
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is the process that reference-frames an abstract model and the economy of the abstract model 
itself. Each order taps into higher-order principles established in political philosophy and 
loops back to govern real-life situations.  
  CT thus significantly facilitates NIOT by outlining a robust conceptualization of the 
evaluation processes at work not just in any conventionalist-based coordination scenario but 
in any institutionalist-based coordination scenario too. Analysis of the qualification process 
can thus bring into focus both the materialized embeddedness of any institution and its 
attachment to universal principles of justification. NIOT has rarely spotlighted these dual-
factor foundations. We anticipate that there is also a second field in which the conventionalist 
vision can refresh and reform neoinstitutional approaches: institutional dynamics. We have 
already underlined how conventions may be the scene of internal dynamics according to the 
complexity of their content and the cross-consistency of their component signals. The paucity 
of material challenges to a justification can thus prove fatal by sparking a generalized loss of 
confidence in the effectiveness of the convention distilled from it. However, this paucity is 
always measured against the yardstick of other competing conventions. This is where we feel 
CT can contribute important insights to NIOT.  
  Following conventionalist logic, coordination problems are not out-of-the-ordinary 
phenomena, and agents are constantly pushed to find local-level arrangements to reduce the 
uncertainty involved in interactions. What the world concept does is to make conventions a 
set of action guidance resources that actors employ on a more or less conscious level. The 
worlds are not tied to any particular organizational boundaryline, but instead are mobilized by 
agents to interpret certain situations
12. This contrasts with NIOT, where the logics are seen as 
                                                                 
12 Looking at the embedded agency paradox, which consists in giving limitless choice of action to individuals 
who are embedded in the social environment, CT appears to be split along the same lines as NIOT. 
Commentators backgrounded in the conventionalist-steam differentiate two approaches: a strategic approach, 
wherein actors post-consciously employ conventions, and an interpretative approach, wherein the conventions 
remain fairly fuzzy to the individuals employing them since they are at the very root of the individuals‟ 
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cognitive structures tied to an organizational field. They tend to reference-frame order and 
stability, which explains why the institutionalist school was so slow in getting to grips with 
these patterns of change. In contrast, the conventionalist conception of the institution as 
resource has far-reaching repercussions, since it normalizes the existence of inter-convention 
conflict. Individuals and their conflict-driven interactions therefore hold centrestage in CT, 
which thus goes some way to replying to criticism leveled by Granovetter (1985) at the 
“oversocialized” side of NIOT (Powell 1991).  
  CT has instinctively searched to model the processes involved in resolving convention 
conflict, whereas NIOT has skirted the issue. CT has comprehensively expanded on a 
particular mode of conflict resolution: compromise. Compromise makes it possible to rise 
above the struggle between competing rationalities as highlighted by the neoinstitutionalist 
school. The face-off confronting different worlds is an immanent input to the CT model, but 
compromise lays the foundations for establishing stable coordination. Thévenot‟s claim is that 
“no order of justification alone is able to govern the complex coordinational networks 
required for organized social living, and cross-justifying several forms of justification 
requires compromises to be forged” (Thévenot 1996: 9). Compromise, here, is not to be read 
as a straightforward arrangement between private individuals or rival interest groups, or 
indeed, on another level, any decoupling between keeping opposing interests in check and the 
false public display of a conciliation agreement. Compromise entails transcending the 
tensions between several justifications. “The road to compromise can be forged by an 
individual working to usher in a switch from one order to another, but to sustainably stabilize 
the compromise requires effective facilities” (Thévenot 1996: 10). These facilities focus the 
parties around a common social good that overrides the clashing justifications. They 
conjugate entity-beings that are qualified within several orders. To observe how this kind of 
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narrates organizations as composite component systems designed to accommodate plural 
imperatives and build these compromises. Compromise is not arrangement: “the concession 
made in an arrangement is, in no unclear terms, the refusal to investigate the deeper principle 
of justice. We’ll cut ourselves a deal to suspend the dispute without working it out, without 
settling the matter” (Thévenot 1996). Under the compromise, searching for a common-ground 
agreement leads the actors to transcend contingencies and unveil how those present share the 
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CONCLUSION   
 
This paper has shown how contributions from CT can facilitate modern NIOT approaches, 
and on more than one count. First, convention theory rounds off the model of institutionalized 
action by turning the spotlight to the role of evaluation in the coordination effort. Evaluation 
is built of qualification processes founded on higher-order principles of justice and grounded 
in material systems. However, the new institutionalist school has so far neglected to study the 
qualification constructs and higher-order principles that would make it possible to categorize 
institutional logics. In parallel, the attention focused on these two components of the 
qualification process also sheds new light on the institutional dynamics issue at the heart of 
NIOT research since the mid-90s. Firstly, it underlines the role to be played by the intrinsic 
quality of the convention. The different levels of effectiveness vectored through the worded 
statement of the institution and the material system supporting it can thus help shape whether 
it is maintained, spreads or withdraws. Second, CT leverages compromise as a concept to 
chart a potential pathway towards resolving competition between several different institutions 
operating within the same „field‟-based radius of action, an issue NIOT has so far neglected. 
Compromise, by defining a common social good that meshes several orders of worth, creates 
the framework necessary to define stable coordination principles despite the divergent initial 






































0  29 
REFERENCES 
 
AACSB. 2007. Impact of research. Draft report of the AACSB task force on research. St 
Louis, ASSCB International.  
Ahmadjian,  C.  L.  and  Robinson,  P.  2001.  Safety  in  numbers:  Downsizing  and  the 
deinstitutionalization  of  permanent  employment  in  Japan.  Administrative  Science 
Quarterly. (46): 622-654.  
Alford,  R.  R.  and  Friedland,  R.  1985.  Powers  of  Theory:  Capitalism,  the  State,  and 
Democracy. Cambridge University Press.  
Banerjee,  A.  V.  1992.  A  simple  model  of  herd  behavior.  The  Quarterly  Journal  of 
Economics, 107(3): 797-817.  
Barley, S. R. and Tolbert, P. S. 1997. Institutionalization and structuration: Studying the links 
between action and institution. Organization Studies, 18(1): 93-117.  
Batifoulier, P. 2001. Théorie des conventions. Paris, Economica.  
Bauman, Z. 1973. Culture as Praxis. London, Routledge.  
Berger,  P.  L.  and  Luckmann,  T.  1966.  The  social  construction  of  reality.  New  York, 
Doubleday.  
Boltanski, L. and Thévenot, L. 1991. De la justification: Les économies de la grandeur. 
Paris, Gallimard  
Boxenbaum, E. and Strandgaard Pedersen, J.  2009. Scandinavian institutionalism – a case of 
institutional  work.  Institutional  Work,  R.  Suddaby,  T.  Lawrence,  &  B.  Leca 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.  
Boyer,  R.  2003.  Les  institutions  dans  la  théorie  de  la  régulation.  Cahiers  d’économie 
politique, 1(44): 79-101.  
Brunsson, N. and Adler, N. 1989. The organization of hypocrisy: talk, decisions, and actions 
in organizations, Chichester (UK), John Wiley & Sons Inc.  
Brunsson, N. and Olsen, J. P. 1993. The reforming organization, Routledge.  
Courpasson,  D. 2000. L'action contrainte : organisations  libérales et  domination, Paris, 
Presses Universitaires de France.  
Czarniawska-Joerges,  B.  and  Sevón  G.  1996.  Translating  organizational  change,  Berlin, 
New-York, de Gruyter.  
Dacin,  M.  T.,  Goodstein,  J.,  et  al.  2002.  Institutional  Theory  and  Institutional  Change: 
Introduction to the Special Research Forum. Academy of Management Journal, 45(1): 
45-56.  
Davis, G. F. and Marquis, C. 2005. Prospects for Organization Theory in the Early Twenty-
First Century: Institutional Fields and Mechanisms. Organization Science, 16(4): 332-
343.  
Deephouse, D. L. 1999. To be different, or to be the same? It's a question (and theory) of 
strategic balance. Strategic Management Journal, 20(2): 147-166.  
DiMaggio, P. 1979. Review essay on Pierre Bourdieu. American Journal of Sociology 84(6): 
1460-1476. 
DiMaggio, P. 1988. Interest and agency in institutional theory. Institutional patterns and 
organizations:  Culture  and  environment.  L.  G.  Zucker,  Pensacola  (Fl),  Ballinger 
Publishing Co/Harper & Row Publishers, Inc: 3-21.  
Eymard-Duvernay, F., Callon, M. et al. 2002. La qualité. Sociologie du Travail, 2: 255-287.  
Eymard-Duvernay,  F.,  Favereau,  O.,  et  al.  2004.  Valeurs,  coordination  et  rationalité. 
L‟economie  des  conventions  ou  le  temps  de  la  réunification  dans  les  sciences 
economiques, sociales et politiques. Problèmes Économiques, 2838: 1-8.  






































0  30 
Friedberg, E. 1998. En lisant Hall et Taylor: néo-institutionnalisme et ordres locaux. Revue 
française de science politique, 48(3): 507-514.  
Friedland, R., and Alford, R. R. 1991. Bringing Society Back in: Symbols, Practices, and 
Institutional Contradictions. The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. eds 
W. W. Powell and P. J. DiMaggio. Chicago, University of Chicago Press: 232-266.  
Giddens, A. 1984. The Constitution of Society. Berkeley, University of California Press.  
Girard, R. 1978. Des choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde, Paris, Grasset.  
Gomez,  P.-Y.  1997.  Economie  des  conventions  et  sciences  de  gestion.  Encyclopédie  de 
Sciences de Gestion, Y.Simon and Joffre, Economica: 1061.  
Gomez,  P.-Y.  2003.  Recherche  en  action  :  proposition  épistémologique  pour  l'analyse 
conventionnaliste. Conventions & Management, M. Amblard. Bruxelles, De Boeck: 
257-277.  
Gomez, P.-Y. 2004. Gouvernement d‟entreprise et institutionnalisme : traduction et trahison. 
Institutions et gestion, H. Isabelle. Paris, Vuibert.  
Gomez,  P.-Y.  and  Jones,  B.  2000.  Conventions:  an  interpretation  of  deep  structure  in 
organizations. Organization Science, 11(6): 696-708.  
Gomez, P. Y. 1996. Le gouvernement de l'entreprise: modèles économiques de l'entreprise 
et pratiques de gestion, Paris, InterEditions.  
Granovetter, M. 1985. Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness. 
American Journal of Sociology, 91: 481-510.  
Greenwood, R., Hinings, C. R., et al. 2002. Theorizing Change: The role of professional 
associations in the transformation of institutionalized fields. Academy of Management 
Journal, 45(1): 58-80.  
Greenwood, R., Oliver C., et al. 2008. Introduction. The Sage Handbook of Organizational 
Institutionalism, R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin and R. Suddaby. London, Sage: 
1-46.  
Hasselbladh,  H.  and  Kallinikos  J.  2000.  The  Project  of  Rationalization:  A  Critique  and 
Reappraisal  of  Neo-Institutionalism  in  Organization  Studies.  Organization  Studies, 
21(4): 697.  
Hirsch, P. and Lounsbury, M., 1997. Ending the family quarrel: Toward a reconciliation of 
"old" and "new" institutionalism. The American Behavioral Scientist, 40(4): 406.  
Joas, H. 1996. The creativity of action, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.  
Leca,  B.  and  Naccache  P.  2008.  Le  nouvel  esprit  du  capitalisme:  some  reflections  from 
France. Organization. 15(4): 614. 
Leibenstein, H. 1976. Beyond Economic Man: A New Foundation for Micro Economics. 
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.  
Leibenstein, H. 1978. General X-Efficiency Theory and Economic Development. New York, 
Oxford University Press.  
Lewis, D. K. 1969. Convention: A Philosophical Study, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University 
Press  
Lounsbury,  M.  2001.  Institutional  sources  of  practice  variation:  Staffing  college  and 
university recycling programs. Administrative Science Quarterly, 46(1): 29-58.  
Meyer,  J.  W.  1992.  Institutionalization  and  the  Rationality  of  Formal  Organizational 
Structure. Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality, J. W. Meyer and W. 
R. Scott. Beverly Hills, Sage.  
Meyer, J. W. and Rowan, B. 1977. Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth 
and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83(2): 340-363.  
North,  D.  C.  1990.  Institutions,  Institutional  Change  and  Economic  Performance, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.  





































0  31 
Parsons, T.  and Shils, E. 1951. Toward a general theory of action. Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press.  
Parsons, T. and Smelser, N. J. 1956. Economy and Society: A Study in the Integration of 
Economic and Social Theory, New York, NY, The Free Press.  
Pfeffer,  J.  2007.  A  modest  proposal:  How  we  might  change  the  process  and  product  of 
managerial research. The Academy of Management Journal, 50(6): 1334-1345.  
Phillips,  N.  and  Malhotra,  N.  2008.  Taking  Social  Construction  Seriously:  Extending  the 
Discursive Approach in Institutional Theory. The SAGE Handbook of Organizational 
Institutionalism. R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin and R. Suddaby. London, SAGE: 
702-720.  
Powell,  W.  W.  1991.  Expanding  the  Scope  of  Institutional  Analysis.  The  new 
institutionalism in organizational analysis, W. W. Powell and P. J. DiMaggio. Chicago 
and London: 183-203.  
Powell, W. W. and DiMaggio, P. 1991. The New institutionalism in organizational analysis. 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press.  
Rao, H., Greve, H. R. et al. 2001. Fool's gold: Social proof in the initiation and abandonment 
of coverage by Wall Street analysts. Administrative Science Quarterly, 46(3): 502-526.  
Roberts, P. W. 2008. Charting Progress at the Nexus of Institutional Theory and Economics. 
The Sage Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism, R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. 
Sahlin and R. Suddaby. London, Sage: 560-572.  
Roberts,  P.  W.  and  Greenwood,  R.  1997.  Integrating  transaction  costs  and  institutional 
theories:  toward  a  constrained-efficiency  framework.  Academy  of  Management 
Review, 22 (2): 346-373.  
Sahlins, M. 1976. Culture and Practical Reason, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press.  
Salais,  R.  2006.  L‟économie  des  conventions.  Encyclopédie  des  sciences  sociales,  Paris, 
PUF.  
Scott,  W.  R.  1987.  The  Adolescence  of  Institutional  Theory.  Administrative  Science 
Quarterly, 32(4): 493-511.  
Scott,  W.  R.  2008[1995].  Institutions  and  organizations:  Ideas  and  interests,  Thousand 
Oaks, Calif., Sage Publications.  
Selznick,  P.  1949.  TVA  and  the  Grass  Roots:  A  Study  of  Politics  and  Organization, 
Berkeley, University of California Press.  
Selznick, P. 1957. Leadership in administration; a sociological interpretation, Evanston, Ill., 
Row.  
Selznick, P. 1969. Law, society and industrial justice, New York, Russel Sage.  
Selznick,  P.  1996.  Institutionalism  "Old"  and  "New".  Administrative  Science  Quarterly, 
41(2): 270-277.  
Sewell, W. H. 1992. A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation. American 
Journal of Sociology, 98(1): 1.  
Simon, H. A. 1947 [1997]. Administrative behavior: a study of decision-making processes in 
administrative organizations. New York, Free Press; London, Collier Macmillan.  
Stark, D. 2005. For a sociology of worth. Center of organizational innovation, Columbia, 
Working Paper.  
Stark, D. 2009. The Sense of Dissonance: Accounts of Worth in Economic Life. Princeton 
University Press. 
Stinchcombe, A. L. 1965. Social structure and organizations. Handbook of Organizations, J. 
G. March. Chicago, Rand McNally: 142-193.  
Stinchecombe,  A.  L.  1997.  On  the  virtues  of  the  old  institutionalism.  Annual  Review  of 





































0  32 
Strang, D. and Soule, S. A.  1998. Diffusion in organizations and social movements: From 
hybrid corn to poison pills. Annual review of sociology, 24(1): 265-290.  
Thévenot,  L.  1996.  Justification  et  compromis.  Dictionnaire  d'éthique  et  de  philosophie 
morale, M. Canto-Sperber. Paris, PUF: 789-794.  
Thornton, P. H. and Ocasio, W. 1999. Institutional logics and the historical contingency of 
power  in  organizations:  Executive  succession  in  the  higher  education  publishing 
industry, 1958-1990. American Journal of Sociology, 105: 801-844.  
Tolbert,  P.  S.  and  Zucker,  L.  G.  1996.  The  Institutionalization  of  Institutional  Theory. 
Handbook of organization studies. S. R. Clegg, C. Hardy and W. R. Nord: 175-187.  
Van  De  Ven,  A.  H.  1993.  The  institutional  theory  of  John  R.  Commons:  A  review  and 
commentary. Academy of Management Review, 18: 129-152.  
Veblen, T. 1909. The limitations of marginal utility. The Journal of Political Economy, 17: 
620-636.  
Weber, M. 1967[1905]. L’éthique protestante et l’esprit du capitalisme Paris, Plon.  
Weick,  K.  E.,  Sutcliffe,  K.  M.,  et  al.  2005.  Organizing  and  the  process  of  sensemaking. 
Organization Science, 16(4): 409-421.  
Welch, I. 1992. Sequential sales, learning and cascades. The Journal of Finance, 47: 695-
732.  
Williamson, O. E. 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism: firms, markets, relational 
contracting. New York, London, Free Press, Collier Macmillan.  
Zucker,  L.  G.  1991.  Postscript:  Microfoundations  of  institutional  thought.  The  New 
Institutionalism  in  Organizational  Analysis.  eds.  W.  W.  Powell  and  P.  DiMaggio. 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press: 103-106. 
h
a
l
-
0
0
5
1
2
3
7
4
,
 
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
1
 
-
 
3
0
 
A
u
g
 
2
0
1
0